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                                       Introduction  
     The Bosporus Straits, that thin line of water that connects the Black Sea with the 
Mediterranean, has always been of the uttermost importance for the riparian states of the 
Black Sea, especially for Russia and Turkey. Their economical significance was known 
since the Greek colonization in the antiquity and, throughout the centuries, the two 
states fought about control over them. For Russia, the Straits mean an exit to the 
Mediterranean Sea and at the same time they are the point from where a hostile fleet 
might attack its Southern shores. For Turkey control over the Straits means control of 
who gets in and out the Black Sea and therefore they mean important power in 
diplomatic relations.  
     In the beginning of the Ottoman occupation of the Straits nobody had the right to 
pass through them. That was “the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire”. Since the 
Russian Empire came in the picture, however, and especially since it managed to obtain 
the northern shores of the Black Sea, treaties started to be signed, regarding the Straits. 
From the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in the 18th century to the Montreux Convention 
Regarding the Regime of the Straits of 1936, which still applies to our days and 
according to which Turkey is in sole charge of who passes through the Straits, several 
treaties have been signed and significant changes have been made to the Straits regime. 
The Treaty of Sevres and the Treaty of Lausanne are some of the most important parts 
of the picture.   
     These treaties were not signed easily and without conflicts of interests. Great 
disputes emerged not only between Russia and Turkey but between the Great Powers 
too, since it was not only the riparian states that had interest in the regime of the Straits. 
Great Britain, for example, would like to assure that the Russian fleet would not be able 
to enter the Mediterranean, which was a British area of influence and interest, and in the 
same time, they would be able to send their ships inside the Black Sea since it was a 
route for her interests in Asia. The USA, although they were not that active in the 
matters of the Straits until after the Second World War, they would still be examining 
closely the developments. Their interests laid on the fact that the Straits should be 
peaceful and open to everyone, in order for them to conduct business with the European 
states.  
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     Since the Montreux Convention was signed, 77 years before, the USSR tried to gain 
control of the Straits by putting pressure on Turkey. The most notable event was the 
Potsdam Conference of 1945, during which the leaders of the three Great Powers were 
deciding the future of the Dardanelles. No agreement was reached though, and the 
constant pressure of the Soviet Union to Turkey in order to take what she wanted, 
resulted in Turkey eventually turning her head towards the West and accepting aid from 
the US, alongside with Greece. The two countries would both join the NATO a few 
years later, in 1952. 
     The story of the Dardanelles Straits is a very important one, since it played a major 
role in the external policies of Russia, and consequently the Soviet Union, and the 
Ottoman Empire, and subsequently Turkey, on one hand and the Great Powers on the 
other. However, many more countries played a role or were affected by these policies. 
Greece is one such example, since she was forced to demilitarize the islands of Lemnos 
and Samothrace under the Treaty of Lausanne which called for a demilitarized zone 
around the Straits, only to remilitarize them after the Montreux Convention. Moreover, 
Greece was an object of Soviet pressure after the Second World War, alongside Turkey, 
which led to the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan. The constant Soviet efforts to 
take control of the Straits by establishing military bases near the Dardanelles are what 
made the USA to take action and proceed with offering financial aid to European 
countries in order to minimize the Soviet influence. Therefore, the matters of the Straits 
affected a large part of Europe and not only the riparian states. It is a topic with many 
aspects and layers that need to be examined.  
     In this paper I will try to examine the impact that the Straits policies had to the 
world, primarily for the Black Sea countries and secondly for the rest of Europe. I will 
try to create the full picture of how these disputes and agreements influenced the course 
of events of modern Black Sea and European history and show that the Soviet desires 
for control over the Straits are just a continuation of the goals of the Russian Empire. 
This would point out that the Straits regime is not only an important matter of modern 
history but has been a significant part of history for centuries.  
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                  The Geography and Importance of the Straits 
      In the 5th century BC, Herodotus described the Straits and the Black Sea in the 
following way: 
“No sea can equal the Euxine Sea; it is 1380 miles long, and 410 wide in its widest part. 
Its mouth is half a mile wide, and the length of the Bosporus, the narrow strait which 
leads to it… is nearly fifteen miles. The Bosphorus joins the Propontis, which is about 
sixty miles wide and a hundred and seventy long, and runs into the Hellespont, a 
narrow strait nearly fifty miles long but less than one mile wide. The Hellespont leads 
into the broad sea we call the Aegean”1.     
     This description remains accurate until our days. The Straits are characterized by 
their length and narrowness. There are strong currents in the area, which make it very 
difficult to sail across the Straits and sailing ships often had to wait for months before 
the desired Southeastern wind that would carry them into the Black Sea would appear2.  
     The southwestern entrance of the Dardanelles is between Cape Helles, at the edge of 
Gallipoli Peninsula, is about 60 miles long and has a tongue-like shape. The 
southeastern coast extends along the mainland of Asia Minor. The Dardanelles are, 
more or less, 36 miles long. 15 miles away from the entrance are the Narrows, whose 
width is between one and two miles long and the passage continues with an average 
width of two miles until the Sea of Marmara. They took their name from the ancient city 
Dardania who, in turn, took its name from Dardanos, the founder of Troy3.  
     The Sea of Marmara connects the Dardanelles with the Bosporus. Its length is 150 
miles and at its widest part is 40 miles long. Its average depth is 493 meters and its 
maximum depth is 1225 meters, so it is proper for a large ship to sail into. The Bosporus 
connects the Sea of Marmara with the Black Sea. The length of the Bosporus is 17 miles 
and has an average width of one to four-and-a-half miles. Its morphology makes it look 
more like a river than a sea and that’s why it does not lack of strategic importance4. Its 
depth does not exceed 27 meters. There are no islands in the Black Sea, close to 
Bosporus, while in the Aegean side there are the two islands called Imvros and 
                                                          
1
 Herodotus, Histories, Book 5, p. 270 
2
 Vali 1972 p. 5 
3
 Nikolaou 1995 p. 25 
4
 Ibid p. 26 
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Tenedos. The geographic position of the Straits makes them significant not only 
because they separate and connect the European and Asian side of Turkey, but also 
because they are the bridge that connects Europe and Asia and a great route of traffic 
and exchange between the two continents5.  
     The Dardanelles and the Bosporus are both privileged to be suited for defense in case 
of a surface attack. Their narrow entrance allows them to defend with an advantage 
against warships. The natural heights on both sides allowed the building of military 
fortifications. Amphibious attacks against the Straits were considered very risky and 
almost impossible, in case of meeting an organized defense of course. Actually, no 
naval force accomplished to force into the Dardanelles or the Bosporus when found 
resistance. The Straits can also be used as traps, into which hostile ships can be lurked 
and then not be allowed to exit. It is well established that in order for one force to 
capture the Straits, it must have naval superiority. The Straits however are exposed from 
the ground, especially from the side of European Istanbul and Eastern Thrace where the 
low lands are no obstacle to a possible hostile attack. This little corner of the Balkans 
forms just a mere 3 per cent of Turkey’s surface but also contains 8 per cent of the 
country’s total population, due to the highly populated metropolis of Istanbul6. Of 
course, the Straits area is exposed in a case of an attack from above and efficient 
defense could be accomplished only by having an adequate and even stronger air force.  
     The geographical position and morphology of the Straits makes them significant for 
political and economic reasons. The Straits are the only passage and link from the Black 
Sea to the Mediterranean. The Trojan War can be regarded as the first known hostile 
episode for the rule of the Straits, and the desire to open the Black Sea market to the 
ancient Greeks while the argonautic myth displays that there have been European 
interests in the Eastern shores of the Black Sea since antiquity7. The transfer of the 
Byzantine capital to Constantinople and the constant attacks by the Ottomans, Francs 
and Venetians shows the exact same thing, the trying of the Empire and its enemies to 
rule the Straits8. In the 20th century the Straits were in the boundaries of a sole country 
and this made them easier to defend. There have been strong armies and naval forces 
that completely failed to seize and occupy the Straits. What made the Straits so 
                                                          
5
 Vali 1972 p. 8 
6
 Ibid p. 9 
7
 Nikolaou 1995 p. 35 
8
 Ibid p. 35 
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important to the diplomacy of the first decades of the 20th century was the position of 
the Soviet Union, which occupied the largest part of the shores of the Black Sea.  
     The territory of the Soviet Union used to stretch as far as the deep ends of Asia and 
the limits of its south side were the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. Although Russia has 
ports in all the shore-sides of its territory, the most important ports were those in the 
Black Sea, like Nikolayev, Rostov, Batumi, Sevastopol and Kerson, since her northern 
ports were frozen during the winter9. At the Lausanne Conference it was stated by the 
Russian delegation that 70 per cent of the Russian grain was exported through the 
Straits. By 1919, 88 per cent of Russian oil, 93 per cent of manganese, 61 per cent of 
iron and 54 per cent of all Russian exports by sea had to enter the Mediterranean by the 
Straits10. It is not only the economic factor, however, that is important to the Soviets. 
The protection of the Straits is also a matter of security for them. The fact that they are 
the only exit for their fleet to the Mediterranean Sea and, at the same time, they only 
way through which their southern coasts could be exposed to attack, made them of 
paramount importance to Soviet security. Since Tsarist Russia existed, she always 
looked for free passage of merchant or war ships and even tried to take control of the 
Straits, while when being on the defensive side, she always objected to the entrance of 
warships into the Black Sea which she considered it to be a closed Sea11.   
     The Straits are very important, if not even more, to the security of Turkey too. In fact 
they are the greatest factor of national interest and security for Turkey. For five 
centuries the Ottoman Empire and, consequently, Turkey based their existence on the 
Straits, having the “ancient rule” which meant that the Straits were closed to all 
warships at all times. The Straits are on the exact spot of Turkey’s link with the West, in 
the Straits region lies the most important city and harbor, the end of the Orient Express 
and its industrial core12. The magnitude of the fight between Turkey and Russia for the 
control of the Straits can be easily understood by the large number of Russo-Turk wars 
over the centuries13.  
     Not only Turkey and the Soviet Union had interests there, though. By 1923, only 20 
per cent of ships passing through the Straits belonged to Black Sea countries and the 
                                                          
9
 Picak 2011 p. 173 
10
 Bilsel 1947 p. 731 
11
 Vali 1972 p. 12 
12
 Ibid p. 12 
13
 Nikolaou 1995 p. 39 
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other 80 per cent belonged to other countries. The states with shores along the Black 
Sea are four, while those with coasts on the Mediterranean are eleven and all of them 
have interests in the Straits. Of course, one cannot forget the most important factor in 
world politics of the times, the Great Powers. Great Britain and, secondary, the USA 
both had significant interests in the area and never hesitated to intervene14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Bilsel 1947 p. 733 
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                                               The Turkish Straits15 
                                                          
15
 Map taken from Nikolaou 1995 p. 24 
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       The Straits during the Ottoman Empire (From 1453 to 1914) 
     We shall examine the history of the Straits from the point that they came under 
Ottoman occupation, however the importance of the city of Constantinople and the 
Straits during the era of the Byzantine Empire is well known.  
     The Ottomans came to rule both the sides of the Dardanelles already by 1356 and 
almost a hundred years later, in 1453 and the occupation of Constantinople they came to 
rule both banks of the Bosporus too. By the year 1475, the whole coastline of the Black 
Sea was under Ottoman occupation, making it an “Ottoman Lake”. In 1479 they 
obtained the islands Thasos, Samothrace, Imbros and Tenedos. The whole Black Sea 
system, with the Black Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Straits was therefore an internal sea 
and the Ottomans kept it close to foreign ships at all times16. Since the Ottomans had in 
their position the whole coastline, it was impossible for any other country to persuade 
them to open the Straits if they did not approve of such a move. Nobody was allowed to 
pass through the Straits and merchant vessels of friendly states which had treaties with 
the Sublime Porte were allowed to sail only until the port of Constantinople17. 
     About three centuries passed with the Straits being completely closed to everyone 
and Russia succeeded in obtaining the Northern shores of the Black Sea. The moment 
that Russia made her presence strong in the Black Sea region, was the moment that the 
Straits question started being raised18. Peter the Great was the first to, unsuccessfully, 
try and take under Russian domination the northern shore of the Black Sea. He did 
manage, however to annex the Sea of Azov into the Russian Empire and create a fleet. 
Eventually it was Catherine the Great with the war of 1768 – 74 and the treaty of Kucuk 
Kaynarca in 1774, which questioned the Ottoman monopoly of the Straits. The 
Ottomans had to let the Crimea peninsula to be independent (although it later came into 
Russian hands) and allow the Russian ships to, not only be able to enter the Black Sea, 
but also exit from it. Russia, moreover, stood up as the “protector” of Christians in 
Moldavia, got the right to build a church in Constantinople, place ambassadors in the 
places she wanted and was allowed to trade throughout the Empire19. Russia pressed the 
                                                          
16
 Dontas 1987 p. 17 
17
 Vali 1972 p. 18 
18
 Kucherov 1949 p. 205 
19
 Nikolaou 1995 p. 46 
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Ottomans to open the Straits for her merchant ships20 and once this was achieved, it was 
a matter of time for the Straits to be open to merchant vessels of all states. This 
happened in the following years but the Straits were still closed to warships of all kind. 
These developments would mark the beginning of decline of the Ottoman Empire. 
     Throughout the years, the Tsarist Russia would constantly make efforts to obtain the 
control of the Straits via an imperialistic policy and would even try to destroy the 
Ottoman Empire. This was because they sought to bring the city of Constantinople back 
to Christianity, have an exit for warships and merchant ships to the Mediterranean and 
to secure her defense against any attacks to her industrial and agricultural region to the 
South21. Although, however, the Russian objective was the control of the Straits and the 
partition of the Ottoman Empire, there were times that it seemed more favorable to let 
the Ottomans exist weakly instead of letting them fall into the hands of another Great 
Power.  
     During the late 18th and early 19th century, the Ottomans signed three treaties with 
the Russians and one with Britain, treaties that had to do with the Straits and the passage 
of warships. In 1809 was signed the treaty with the British, according to which, the 
Straits would be closed to all foreign warships in time of peace and the British would 
support the Ottomans in case of a power trying to act the opposite. This was the 
“ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire”. In 1798, 1805 and 1833 Treaties of Alliance 
were signed with the Russians. 
     Napoleon’s expedition in Egypt during 1798, whose goal was the disturbance of the 
British trade in the Orient22, led to the creation of an alliance between Great Britain, 
Russia and the Ottomans. It was during that year, that for the first time Russian ships 
sailed through the Dardanelles and entered the Aegean Sea. They ended the French rule 
of the Dodecanese islands and were welcomed as saviors by the locals. According to the 
first two articles of this treaty, the Russian ships had the right to sail into and out of the 
Black Sea, until the war with France was over23. Being present in the Mediterranean, the 
Russians managed in 1805 to sign another treaty with the Ottomans which opted for 
freedom of passage for Russian ships, bilateral protection of the Straits and closing of 
                                                          
20
 Grosek 2004 p. 74 
21
 Vali 1972 pp. 19 - 20 
22
 Watson 2003 p. 13 
23
 Grosek 2004 p. 88 
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the Straits to the ships of non-riparian states24. The Russian Empire was taking 
advantage of the military conflicts of the time and was taking control of the Straits and 
an exit to the Mediterranean. 
     However, after 1806 and the dissolution of the German Empire, Sultan Selim 3rd, 
infringed the treaty of 1805, an event which was causing problems to the Russian 
replenishment in the Dodecanese. By June of 1807 and the Russian defeat in Friedland, 
the Russians were forced out of the Mediterranean. In 1829, the Treaty of Adrianople 
was signed according to which, except for the creation of new states, the Straits were 
open to merchant ships and the Russian trade was secured25. A new crisis in the 
Ottoman grounds in 1833 gave the Russians the opportunity to intervene one more time. 
The Egyptian Muhammad Ali, invaded Asia Minor and was about to attack 
Constantinople when the Russians saw their chance for obtaining further privileges at 
the Straits26. The Russian fleet sailed to Constantinople and the other powers realized 
the danger of the presence of Russian ships there. They forced the Ottomans and the 
Egyptians to reach a settlement but, before the Russians retreated, they signed the 
Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833. According to this treaty, the Ottomans had to close 
the Straits to all foreign warships, except for Russian, in exchange for Russian 
protection27.  
     After the treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi in 1833, the Ottomans, without a doubt, placed 
themselves under the protective wing of Russia which, of course, was very pleased with 
the outcome. The Empire had started to fall and it was now on the hands of the Great 
Powers to decide whether it would continue to exist or if it had to fall apart. This treaty 
gave the right to Russia to place and maintain a number of military troops within 
Ottoman ground and, therefore, be able to arrive quickly on spot if there were any new 
developments and solve the “Eastern Question” (which is the problem of who should 
have the control of the Straits) in her own advantage. The Russians managed to take and 
maintain a very privileged position in the matters of the Straits during the wars of the 
past three decades.   
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 Sfetas 2009 pp. 100 - 101 
25
 Ibid pp. 103 - 105 
26
 Esmer 1947 p. 292 
27
 Dontas 1987 p. 20 
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     This did not last for too long though. On the 13nth of July 1841 was signed the 
London Agreement which canceled the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi28. A new crisis in 
Egypt in 1839 made it necessary for the matter of the Straits to be debated in an 
international conference. The Ottomans were crushed by the army of Muhhamad Ali 
and Sultan Mahmud 2nd died. The British saw a chance to step in as protectors of the 
Ottoman Empire and managed to call for a conference in London between the Great 
Powers. Russia was at first hesitant to participate, since it thought that such a move did 
not have the purpose of strengthening the Ottomans but weakening the Russian position 
on the Straits. When they were informed however that the Conference would take place 
anyway, whether they would participate or not, they decided to participate and support 
their thesis that the Straits should be closed to all warships at all times29. According to 
the London Agreement, which had four points, the Ottomans would keep the Straits 
closed to all foreign warships and all states had to support this decision. The signatories 
were Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The 
Russians had managed three times to open the Straits for their ships, all in cases of 
emergency for the Ottoman Empire, and all those times, after the emergency stopped 
existing, the “ancient rule” was restored30. The Russians consented to the London 
agreement in hopes of reaching an agreement with Great Britain about the dissolution of 
the Ottoman Empire and they were once again losing their privileges at the Straits31. 
     In 1856 the Paris Agreement was signed, which opted for the neutralization of the 
Black Sea, as it was decided in the Vienna Conference that took place one year earlier. 
The Crimean War and the defeat of the Russians by the British and the French brought 
the Russians in a difficult position. They had to choose one out of three choices: to limit 
their naval power inside the Black Sea, retrieve the military fortifications and 
shipbuilding yards or accept the fact that foreign forces would be able to pass through 
the Straits32. They decided to propose the second option, having in mind that the Sultan 
would be allowed to close the Straits in case of war or in case the Empire felt threatened 
by the war of other powers. However, the Russian proposal was rejected, the Black Sea 
was neutralized and the Russians had to demilitarize the northern coast (except for six 
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 Hurewitz 1972 Vol. I p. 123 
29
 Bilsel 1947 p. 735 
30
 Vali 1972 p. 22 
31
 Sfetas 2009 p. 113 
32
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small steam vessels and two guardships33). Russia now had lost everything that she 
managed to obtain in the previous decades and was, once again, cut from the access to 
the Straits.  
     Russia, since it had sunk the Ottoman fleet during the naval combat of Sinope in 
1853, and turned the Black Sea into a Russian Lake, was not very pleased with this 
neutralization since it was imposing a restriction to her sovereignty34. During the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1870, Russia found the chance to denounce the Agreement 
unilaterally. While Germany supported Russia and France could not take action, Great 
Britain and Austria-Hungary opposed to the Russian move35. These developments led to 
the London Conference of 1871 which took place after an initiative of Bismarck who 
wanted to reward Russia for maintaining a neutral position during the Franco-Prussian 
war36.  Although the Conference stressed that a unilateral denouncement of a treaty is 
not acceptable, they abolished the neutralization of the Black Sea due to changed 
conditions since it was signed. The Ottomans were allowed to open the Straits to the 
warships of friendly powers during peace time. One more war between Russia and the 
Turks took place in 1877 – 1878 and the victorious Russians managed to open the 
Straits for their warships with the Treaty of San Stefano, however this was quickly 
revised by the Treaty of Berlin (1878). The situation before the First World War was 
that the Straits were open to all merchant vessels at all times and closed to all warships 
during peace time. During a war, in which the Ottomans participated, there was no 
provision governing the Straits37.  
     In the first years of the 20th century, however, the scenery changed drastically. This 
started in the end of the previous century. The British began to wonder whether it was 
profitable to continue and support the Ottoman Empire. France, on the other hand, after 
she lost the war of 1870 - 71 to Germany, was open to an alliance with Russia. The 
British also saw a threat in the rise of Germany and the German fleet, while at the same 
time the Ottoman Empire was getting military and financial help from Germany.  
     The Russian desire for control over the Straits grew stronger after their defeat in their 
war with Japan in 1905. Their lack of capability to send their Black Sea ships in the Far 
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 Maity 1954 p. 138 
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East made the necessity for obtaining the Straits greater38. The Russians tried to obtain 
control of the Straits in 1908, by taking advantage of the opportunities created by the 
matter of Bosnia-Herzegovina. During a meeting in the Moravian castle Buchlov, 
Isvolsky, the Russian Foreign Minister, asked his Austrian counterpart, Aeherenthal for 
a modification in the status of the Straits, in exchange for approval of the annexation of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary39.  
     Sir F. Bertie informed Sir Edward Grey: He (Isvolsky) stated that in the course of an 
interview which he had with Baron d’Aehrenthal on the 15th of September that Minister 
had said that certain circumstances might cause Austria to annex Bosnia and 
Herzegovina… As far as Russia was concerned she had no territorial ambitions on 
Turkey and she only desired the maintenance of the status quo and the integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire; but in the event of a revision she would require a modification, in a 
sense favorable to herself and the other riverain states of the Black Sea, of the 
stipulations concerning the Straits40. 
     What the Russians asked for was “that in time of war, when Turkey was neutral, she 
should observe her neutrality by giving equal facilities for passage through the Straits 
to all the belligerents41”. 
     Of course, the Russians had the support of Great Britain and France and they were 
sure that if Austria agreed, Germany would follow. If the Austrians agreed, then the 
Russians would guarantee to the Ottomans that they would support them in any 
conference that might consider the revision of the Treaty of Berlin. Not much in favor 
of Russia happened though. Sir Edward Grey wrote to Sir G. Lowther:  
We have secured that the question of the Straits should not be mentioned in the 
programme of the Conference; we have urged upon Russia that it is not opportune to 
ask Turkey to negotiate about it now, and that the consideration of it should therefore 
be postponed42.  
     Unfortunately for the Russians, there was no agreement during these talks, so when 
the annexation of Bosnia was announced, the Russians offered the Turks protection 
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against the Austrians in exchange for free passage through the Straits. The suspicious 
Turks did not agree though43. A Second effort was attempted in 1911, similar to the 
first. Taking advantage of the Italian occupation of Tripolitania, the Russians asked the 
Ottomans for a revision of the Straits regime in exchange of the Russian support in a 
conference regarding the Treaty of Berlin. Moreover, they offered the renegotiation of 
the Anatolian Railway agreement, promised to do their best to try and stabilize the 
situation in the Balkans (the Balkan Wars were about to begin) and they hinted that they 
would put pressure on Britain and France in order to accept the Empire as a member of 
the Triple Entente. The Russians dropped their plans, however, thinking that making 
such agreements in a period of international tension might prove to have unwanted 
consequences44. During the Balkan Wars, the Russians were orientated towards 
maintaining the status quo in the Straits and after the Wars ended, the Ottoman Empire 
had suffered sufficient losses. 
     The failure of Russia to make use of the right of freedom of passage for her warships 
through the Straits, through a revision of the Straits regime which the Ottomans 
believed would bring the eventual end to the Empire, had the result of eliminating their 
chances of imposing their will on Turkey in a case of a possible war. In addition to that, 
the continuing pressure of Russia to maintain such a right and, at the same time, the 
refusal or incapability of Britain and France to oppose to the Russian plans, brought the 
Ottomans to the realization that they cannot expect support from the Entente Powers 
and therefore they turned for help in Germany. It can be stated, therefore, that the 
Russian pressure to obtain free passage through the Straits, was one of the reasons that 
the Turks chose the side of the Central Powers45. 
     By the beginning of the 20th century the Ottoman Empire had shrunk and not much 
was left to resemble that at some time a huge empire existed. The First World War 
would find it in a very weak point and the Straits would play an important role in this 
Great War46. 
 
                                                          
43
 Langer 1928 p. 324 
44
 Macfie 1993 pp. 36 - 37 
45
 Ibid p. 43 
46
 Vali 1972 pp. 25 - 26 
16 
 
         The Straits during the First World War (1914 – 1918) 
     During the First World War the opposing camps were Germany with Austria-
Hungary on one hand and Britain, France and Russia on the other.  
     On the beginning of the War, the Straits were not a priority for the Entente powers, 
since they believed that the War, which was not supposed to last long, was going to be 
judged on the fronts of France and Russia. The Straits were viewed under the light of a 
general Balkan policy, according to which, the Balkan states would be used either to 
bring the Ottomans on the Entente side, or in order to put pressure on them in case they 
joined the Central Powers, which was considered the most likely to happen47.   
     The Germans, on the other hand, were very skeptical about having the Ottomans on 
their side. They valued the tactical advantages of the closed Straits but the fact that the 
Ottoman army was very weakened by the constant wars (it was only a year after the 
Balkan Wars) made them doubtful of Turkey’s worth as an ally. The results of the War 
however were very disappointing and the Germans could use a new ally. Negotiations 
started on 22 July 1914 when the Turks proposed themselves as an ally and by August 2 
1914, the Ottomans had signed a secret agreement according to which they would enter 
the war on the side of the Central Powers48, provided that “Turkey either can or will 
undertake some action against Russia worthy of the name”49.  
     On August 10, two German battle ships entered the Dardanelles, named Breslau and 
Goeben, and sailed to Constantinople50. During that period, the Ottomans had two 
warships in British shipyards for repair which were taken into British rule51, something 
that was not seen very positively in the Turks’ eyes. After that, the Germans gave the 
two German ships as a present to the Ottomans, although the people operating them 
would still be German. This German gift made the Ottomans superior to the Russians, 
when it comes to navy of course52. The Entente powers demanded that the ships should 
be driven away from Constantinople, since their presence consisted a violation of the 
Treaty of Paris, but the Turks replied that they had bought the ships. The Entente 
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powers then, asked for the German crews to leave and the Turkish reply was once more 
negative. Although the Entente could declare war on Turkey, they decided that it was 
better to not enlarge their list of enemies53.   
     The Ottomans, however, were hesitating to enter the War since they knew that their 
army was weak. Most Turks were negative about the prospect of joining the War and 
those who were not, doubted if the Central Powers were the best choice. The failure of 
Germany to invade Paris, and therefore diminishing their hopes for a quick war, made 
the Turks even more hesitant. Since the Turks made it clear to the Germans that they 
would not take any form of action until they were ready, the Germans decided to help 
them. They sent over supplies and hundreds of German soldiers and officers were sent 
to Turkey. The British were aware of the building of the German army on the Turkish 
grounds and warned the Vizier of the consequences. The British would, until the very 
end, respect Turkey’s “neutrality” and would not initiate any attacks.    
     After two months of being reluctant to enter the War and receiving pressure from 
Britain and France to stay neutral, the Ottomans finally gave permission to the two 
newly acquired ships to enter the Black Sea and bombard Russian ports in the 29th of 
October, 1914. Immediately, Russia, Britain and France declared war on the Ottomans. 
The Ottomans joining the war gave the chance to the Russians to once more try to 
achieve their wishes about the Straits. The British, afraid that the Russians might change 
their orientation and move its forces from the main front to the West, warned them that 
nothing should distract their attention from defeating the Germans. The Russians 
accepted the British warnings but soon started negotiation about the fate of the Straits in 
case of winning the War54. 
     The British were decisive that, in the case of victory, the fate of the Straits would not 
be decided without taking Russia into consideration. Even the King informed 
Beckendorff, the Russian Ambassador in London, that “in regard to Constantinople, it 
is clear that it must be yours55”. For the time being, the Russians did not propose any 
specific desires regarding the Straits, leading the British and French to believe that they 
would be satisfied with freedom of passage through the Straits. Incorporation of the city 
of Constantinople in the Russian Empire did not seem to be in their immediate plans, 
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although in later communications this idea was discussed too. More specifically, 
Nemitz, the Russian Chief of Black Sea operations, stated in a memorandum in 
December 1914: 
“Russia must dominate the Straits and the Constantinople region in a manner… which, 
while it secures Russian interests, enables her at the same time not only to avoid 
weakening, but actually to consolidate, her international position… From this viewpoint 
it appears essential but also sufficient… to affirm that the Straits are absolutely 
indispensible to us… but that we do not at all require Constantinople as a city”56.  
     Although the Turkish decision to join the Central Powers proved to be disastrous for 
the Empire, it gave the Central Powers a significant advantage, which is nothing but the 
control of the Straits, whose importance was displayed greatly during the War.  
     With the closing of the Straits, the British and French could not supply the Russians 
with weaponry. The Baltic route was also blocked by German ships, the port of 
Arkhangelsk in the Arctic was frozen for a large part of the year and the port of 
Murmansk and the railroad leading to it were still under construction. Moreover, Russia 
could not be provided with wheat and cereal, which caused a great hunger throughout 
its territory. While Russia could provide a great manpower, only a portion of them 
could eventually be armored with weapons and it is one of the reasons that the Russian 
people revolted and Russia withdrew from the War. 
     Britain and France tried unsuccessfully to open the Straits, as the Russians 
suggested57, but their failures made them step back by January 1916. An attack against 
the Dardanelles was in the minds of the British army since 1914 but it was not until the 
early days of 1915 that such a thing started to get discussed seriously. It was decided 
that on the 19th of February 1915, the British navy would bombard the Gallipoli 
peninsula with a target of taking Constantinople.  
     During the months that preceded Turkey’s entry into the war, the Turks managed to 
strengthen the defensive facilities of the Straits. Mines were set up, alongside with 
twenty – one batteries, dummy positions and searchlights. The day of the attack there 
were eleven lines of mines ready to destroy the British fleet. The British made two 
efforts to take the Straits: one on the 19th of February and the other one month later, on 
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the 18th of March 1915. Although they managed to make some damage to the defensive 
systems of the Turks, their efforts were not successful.  
     The British attempt to take the Straits in February made the Russians suspicious 
about the true desires of the British. Moreover, the British were discussing the 
possibility of bringing Greece into the War, a country which also had aspirations in the 
city of Constantinople and the Russians would definitely not want to let the Greeks take 
part into the discussions about the Straits. In addition to that, the British declared that 
they would support a favorable settlement of the Straits for Russia but the details would 
be discussed after the War ended, which was something that the Russians also did not 
want. Seeing all these, Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister sent the following note to 
the British and the French: 
Course of the latest events leads his Majesty the Emperor Nicholas to think that the 
question of Constantinople and the Straits must be definitely solved in accordance with 
traditional aspirations of Russia.  
Any solution would be unsatisfactory and precarious if it did not incorporate 
henceforward in Russian Empire the city of Constantinople, western shore of the 
Bosphorus, of the Sea of Marmora and of the Dardanelles, as well as Southern Thrace 
up to Enos – Midia line. 
Ipso-facto and by strategic necessity, part of Asiatic shore included between the 
Bosphorus, River Sakharia and a point to be fixed on the Gulf of Ismid, island of the Sea 
of Marmora, Islands of Imbros and Tenedos, ought to be incorporated in the Empire. 
Special interests of France and of Great Britain in the region above described will be 
scrupulously respected. 
Imperial Government likes to hope that above considerations will meet with sympathy 
of the two Allied Governments. Said Governments are assured of meeting with, at the 
hands of Imperial Government, the same sympathy for realization of desiderata which 
they may form in other regions of Ottoman Empire and elsewhere58”.   
     The Allies realized that what Russia was claiming was far more than they had 
previously discussed and they were uncomfortable because freedom of passage through 
the Straits was one thing and complete rule over them, with fortifications, by Russia 
was another. They believed that more than one or two countries had interests in the 
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Straits. However, in fear that the Russians might sign a separate peace with Germany, 
the decided to accept the Russian claims.  
     In the meanwhile, after the two failed attempts to take the Dardanelles, the British 
attacks continued. This time they decided it was better to make an attack, not only with 
the navy, but from the ground too. By the 25th of April the first landings of troops took 
place and, eventually, about 20,000 soldiers were gathered. Although they fought hard, 
they reached a point where their position was not threatened but they could not advance 
too. The British officers however decided to let them there, as a means of pressure to 
Turkey. It was not until December that they decided to withdraw the soldiers from the 
Straits. This operation was the greatest military operation to ever try and capture the 
Straits in modern history59.  
     It was not only the Allies that were negotiating with the Russians about the Straits 
though. The Central Powers also made communication about this issue with Russia on a 
number of times. The matter was discussed during the Molotov – Hitler talks of 
November 191460, while in March 1915 there were rumors that the Russians were 
negotiating a separate peace with the Germans in exchange for the Straits. The Turks 
too negotiated with Russia, especially during the period of the British Bombardments in 
1915.  
     So, the situation was that the Russians managed to agree with the other two powers 
in order to seize Constantinople. Although the Russians were in favor of the British and 
French tries to open the Straits, they did not want the city of Constantinople to fall into 
their hands, or even the Greeks’ who had been offered such gifts in case they entered 
the War. 
     The British and the French, after the exchange of notes, agreed to alter their century 
old policy and allow Russia to take control of the Straits, in case the War had the 
desired result. The city of Constantinople, the Western side of the Bosporus, the 
Marmara and the Dardanelles and the Eastern side of the Bosporus, alongside with the 
islands Imbros and Tenedos, were all promised to the Russians61. All that Britain and 
France asked for was free passing through the Straits for their merchant ships and a free 
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port in Constantinople. Russia would be allowed to forbid entrance to any foreign 
warship. 
     What would happen though, neither the Russians nor the British could foresee. The 
Bolshevik Revolution of March 1917 changed all their plans. Even though the Foreign 
Minister of the provisional Government, Mr. Miliukov, kept on claiming the Straits for 
Russia, he found strong opposition within his own colleagues. When he resigned in May 
1917, it marked the ending of the Russian aspirations to take control of the Straits, 
during the First World War. The Bolsheviks, in the Decree of Peace of 8 November 
1917 and the Proclamation to the Mussulmans of December 1917 stated: 
“We give notice that the secret treaties… concerning the seizure of Constantinople… 
have now been torn up and destroyed. The Russian Republic and her Government, the 
Council of People’s Commissaries, are against the seizure of foreign lands. 
Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Mussulmans62”. 
     By the summer 1918 it was established that Turkey would be defeated. By early 
1916 the United States had received information about the secret agreements according 
to which the Ottoman Empire would be carved up63. The British and French created a 
draft of conditions which Turkey had to accept in order for a peaceful stop of the 
hostilities. These conditions asked for free passage for all Allied ships through the 
Dardanelles, Marmara and Bosporus and access to the Black Sea, denial of passage to 
the enemy, British occupation of Constantinople and fortifications on both sides of the 
Dardanelles. There were also other conditions regarding the mines that were in the 
Black Sea.  
     The Turks accepted most of the conditions but they would oppose in the setting of 
fortifications and the occupation of Constantinople. However, they could not do much 
in order to resist so, in the end, they gave in. They would dismantle their guns and 
create a joint commission that would control the forts of the Straits. By November 1918 
British and Indian soldiers occupied the forts and the British fleet sailed through the 
Dardanelles and into the Sea of Marmara.    
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From the End of the First World War to the Treaty of Lausanne 
     In the armistice signed at Mudros in 1918, following the ending of the First World 
War, the Entente powers managed to obtain the right to occupy the Straits’ defenses, 
have their warships sailing inside the Black Sea and the Sea of Marmora and occupy 
parts of Turkey necessary for their security. They were not only victorious over the 
Central Powers but they also saw the Russian Empire fall in the hands of the Bolsheviks 
and denounce any imperialistic claims in the Straits and in general.  
     They were not in a hurry, however, to decide on a firm position about the fate of the 
Straits and the Constantinople area. In the meanwhile, they secured the Straits zone to 
their best interest. In November and December 1918, the British had dismantled the 
guns in the Asiatic shores of the Straits and Allied troops were positioned in 
Constantinople. The Turks were forced to disarm their forces and in January 1919 
Constantinople was divided into three zones, for the British, the French and the Italians 
who had control of the local police64.  
     While in the meantime the Entente powers were trying to decide what they would do 
with Turkey, the US President Wilson refused to acknowledge any secret agreements 
made during the War. Moreover, he created the League of Nations, which was an 
authority that would appoint mandatories over states that were not able to advance and 
maintain stability without the help of the Great Powers.  
     The Americans had interests in the Straits, in the sense that they wanted their 
commercial ships to be able to get in and out the Black Sea at will. They believed that 
the Straits should be internationalized or put under the control of a single power which 
would guarantee their freedom. President Wilson, in his fourteen points, which were the 
peace terms from the side of the USA pointed that: 
“The Turkish positions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure 
sovereignty, but other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured 
an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous 
development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to 
the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees”65. 
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     The British did not oppose to the point raised by President Wilson since it did not 
conflict with their interests in Asia. They knew that the Russians would not stay weak 
for too long and the possibility of Germany standing up on her feet again was not to be 
eliminated. According to that policy, internationalized Straits that would allow her fleet 
to move into the Black Sea was important for Great Britain. However, a new guardian 
of the Straits should be found since Turkey proved that she was unreliable. Neither of 
the Great Powers desired the Straits to be in the hands of another Great Power and if 
they were in the hands of a minor power, like Greece, they would be open to influence. 
The proposal of the US to be in charge was denied. The French were also in favor of an 
international commission being in charge of the Straits.  
     No decision was reached until October 1919 and the Turks had started to rise again. 
The Greek occupation of Smyrna, with British support, was the one event that made the 
Turks to take arms again. Mustafa Kemal within months, managed to create a strong 
nationalistic movement which was strong enough to oppose to any plans the Great 
Powers had. On the matter of the Straits, however, they recognized that 
internationalization was to their best interest. On the National Pact, they declared: 
The security of Istanbul (which is the Kalifate if Islam, the capital of the Sultanate, and 
the headquarters of the Ottoman Government) and likewise the security of the Sea of 
Marmara must be protected from every danger. Provided this principle Is maintained, 
whatever decision may be arrived at jointly by us and all other Governments concerned, 
regarding the opening of the Bosporus to the commerce and traffic of the world, shall 
be valid66. 
     What the British and the French could not decide was whether the Sultan and the 
Turkish government should be expelled from Constantinople. There were lots of matters 
to be taken into consideration, for example the reaction of the Muslim population in the 
Asian parts of the world that the British had interests to. On 12 of February 1920, the 
Allies met for a conference in London in order to draft a peace treaty for Turkey.  
     After agreeing that the Sultan should remain in Constantinople, they also agreed on 
the internationalization of the Straits. There would be a demilitarized zone that would be 
controlled by an international commission. Greece and Turkey would be divided by the 
Chatalja line. In the Straits zone all fortifications, roads and railways would be 
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destroyed and only a restricted number of troops would be allowed. Turkey would 
delegate to a Commission of the Straits that would be in charge of the area between the 
two edges of the Dardanelles and the waters in a three mile radius from each edge. The 
Commission would be composed by representatives of the United States, Britain, 
France, Italy, Russia, Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. The Peace Treaty was discussed 
further and modified in San Remo, between 18 and 26 of April and was presented to the 
Turks in Paris in 11th of May, 1920. It was signed in Sevres on 10th of August 1920 after 
pressure of the Greek army with the support of the British.  
     When Kemal came in power, he sought diplomatic relations with the new Bolshevik 
state. The Russians were seeing the Turks as the westernmost frontier of a series of 
states against capitalistic imperialism but Kemal thought of his war as a national one, 
not a class one. The Russians, in 2 June 1920, asked for the Straits question to be 
discussed among the Black Sea states but the Turks managed to avoid discussions67. 
The two states signed a Treaty of Friendship on March 16, 192168. According to that 
treaty, the regions of Kars and Ardahan were given to Turkey whose eastern borders 
were those of present day Turkey69. 
     During the next couple of years, the rise of the Young Turk movement and a series 
of military episodes like the destruction of Smyrna and the Chanak episode, which in 
turn led to the Armistice of Mudanya, and the rise of Kemal in power, would lead to the 
Conference of Lausanne. The Treaty of Sevres proved to be of no use any more but it 
was used as the basis for further discussions in the Conference of Lausanne70. 
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                       The Conference of Lausanne (1922 – 1923) 
     The Conference of Lausanne started on 20 November 1922.  The British recognized 
that the Turks were no longer a nation that was defeated and which they would easily 
dictate. What they would seek would be freedom of the Straits. The Russians on the 
other hand, who were invited only to take part in the discussions about the Straits 
regime71, would try to close the Straits since they were still trying to gain power and 
were feeling that the need for defense was greater than the need to expand. The French 
would also agree with the Russians, since they were intimidated by the British fleet. The 
Romanians would probably follow the French and the Italians were expected to agree 
with Britain at a price. Greece was steadily next to Britain, the Serbs were unpredictable 
and Turkey was believed to agree to freedom of passage for commercial ships only. 
Moreover, the Turks managed to persuade the Allies to accept the participation of 
representatives from Ukraine and Georgia72. The United States, although they were 
asked to participate in the conference, decided to be present at all discussions and 
expected to be treated with equality even though they would not sign any papers73. 
There were many countries that wanted to participate in the Conference and they all had 
the right to be heard but not all countries should talk for every issue. So, it was decided 
that the Conference would be held among the countries that were in war with Turkey, 
but every interested party would be heard74.  
     The first meeting of the Straits Commission was held on the 4th of December 1922. 
The Russian proposal that Mr. Chicherin put on the table was: The principle of freedom 
for peaceful navigation in the Straits and the principle of closing the Straits to all 
vessels of war mutually complete each other, as only the fact that they are closed to all 
warships, armed vessels and military aircraft of other nations can effectively guarantee 
the freedom of peaceful navigation in those waters...  The Turkish government will only 
be in position to defend the Straits… if it receives express recognition of its right to 
fortify and arm its coasts…”75 
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     The Turks were pleased to hear the Russian proposals, not recognizing probably that 
such a thing would turn the Black Sea into a closed Russian sea. One of the basic 
Turkish aspirations was the rejection of any regime that would allow Greece to have a 
saying on the matters of the Straits. The Turks wanted to take control or demilitarize the 
islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Imbros and Tenedos76. However, after pressure from 
the British, the Turks agreed on discussing any other proposals. Curzon, the British 
Foreign Minister, took advantage of it, pointing some flaws of the Russian proposals: In 
the first place, apart from the fact that it ignores the principle of international law that 
the passage between the two seas should be regarded as an international highway, it 
would, if adopted by this conference, give to Russia a position of exceptional and 
indefensible advantage within the Black Sea. In other words, although Russian and 
Turkish warships have the right under international law to free passage through the 
Suez, Panama and Kiel canals and through all the other straits of the world, M. 
Chicherin proposes to deny these rights to other nations in regard to the passage 
between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. In the second place, he contended that 
the opening of the Straits to warships would be to the advantage of the strongest naval 
Power. But he omitted to mention that the closing of the Black Sea would place the 
other littoral countries at the mercy of the littoral Power possessing the strongest land 
forces, in other words, Russia itself77.  
    The American Ambassador Child stressed the American position on the matters of 
the Straits: 
“Our position is based upon that policy of our Government which stands for complete 
and constant freedom, without special privilege, for our commerce and for the 
commerce of other nations… We cannot accept the position that the future of commerce 
in the Black Sea is the exclusive affair of the States border upon it…78” 
     Before the Conference of Lausanne took place, the British and the French had 
meetings, discussing the matters of the Straits. What they both agreed on was the 
creation of a demilitarized zone,  the creation of a commission of control that would be 
on the authority of the League of Nations, freedom of passage through the Straits and 
limitation of Turkish army in Eastern Thrace.   
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     The British and French gave their common proposals to the Turkish Pasha who 
responded with a regime based on the following principles: a guarantee securing the 
Straits, Constantinople and the Sea of Marmora against any surprise attack by land or 
sea, limitation of the naval forces which may enter the Black Sea, so that they shall not 
constitute danger for the districts between the two Straits and in the Black Sea. These 
forces could consist of light craft employed for the protection of international commerce 
and freedom of passage both in war and peace for merchant-men; in case Turkey is 
belligerent, she will be satisfied with such technical control as is indispensable. 
 
     On the other hand, there were parts of the British proposals that the Turks found 
harmful to their interests: from the term “Straits” the Sea of Marmara should be 
excluded since defensive preparations on the coasts of the sea were required for the 
defense of Anatolia and Thrace, instead of a demilitarized zone around the Bosporus 
there should be no land or sea fortifications on either shores, movement of troops should 
be allowed in the demilitarized zone since this zone connects two parts of the country, 
Turkey should maintain arsenals and naval establishments at Constantinople and in the 
Straits, the area of the demilitarized zone should be reduced, Turkish sovereignty should 
be affirmed on the islands of Samothrace, Imbros and Tenedos and Lemnos should be 
declared autonomous and, finally, they should be allowed to have a minimum defense 
on Gallipoli peninsula in order to be prepared for a surprised attack. 
     The Allies were pleasantly surprised by the turn of events and were willing to make 
a few compromises, if their interests were not harmed. Since their goal of demilitarized 
Straits and freedom of passage was achieved, they would not ruin it by not giving the 
Turks a little of what they wanted. The Russians however were not willing to accept 
such things. M. Chicherin stated: “We therefore see, on looking into the last draft of the 
inviting Powers, that it threatens the vital interests of Russia, violates the most 
elementary requirements of Turkey as regards her safety and independence, 
necessitates fresh naval armaments and places obstacles in the way of general peace79” 
and even threatened the Turks that this behavior would be considered hostile. The 
Russians insisted on the proposals made by Chicherin on the first day of the 
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Commission. Curzon kept a very firm stance, unwilling to accept the Russian demands 
and the Turks eventually followed him and accepted the British proposals.  
     Eventually, in 31 January 1923 the British presented the final draft to the Turks. 
According to that, they would not allow the military force in the Gallipoli peninsula but 
they agreed on the restoration of Imbros and Tenedos to Turkish sovereignty, the 
withdrawal of articles about inspection of the demilitarized zone and the article about 
immediate response by the Allied powers in case that the demilitarized zone was 
imperiled. Lemnos and Samothrace would stay under Greek rule but they would be 
demilitarized.80  The Dodecanese islands and Rhodes were given to Italy81. The actual 
treaty was signed on the 24th of July, 1923 although the Russians refused to sign82 and 
would not reconcile with the Treaty for the next few years83. M Chicherin stated during 
the last meeting of the commission:  
“Taking account of the fact that the draft convention concerning the regime of the 
Straits presented by the inviting Powers threatens the security and vital interests of 
Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia; 
That it makes it impossible to establish a stable and peaceful situation in the Near East 
and on the Black Sea; 
That it will result in imposing on Russia and the other countries and additional burden 
of naval armaments and places an obstacle in the way of establishing general peace;… 
… The Russo-Ukrainian-Georgian delegation do not agree to the draft of the inviting 
Powers, make it clear that they are irreconcilably opposed to the whole policy of 
domination and violence expressed in this draft, and wish to emphasize the inability of 
the present conference to accomplish a work of real peace. 
At the present time, there is no agreement with Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia… 
Under these conditions there cannot be any decision in the Straits question. There is 
none and there will not be any without Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia. If the 
convention is signed without Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, the latter will retain an 
entirely free hand and complete liberty of action. If certain Powers sign this convention 
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without Russia, the Ukraine and Georgia, the Straits question remains and will remain 
open84”. 
     The Straits convention was signed on a separate draft than the rest of the Treaty of 
Lausanne in order to maintain its stability, in case peace was interrupted and the rest of 
the Treaty was out of use. 
     The Allies were obliged by the Treaty of Lausanne to allow Turkey to close the 
Straits at will when at war, the right to stop and search neutral vessels that might be 
assisted enemies, the right to send troops through the demilitarized zone and the right to 
place soldiers in Eastern Thrace. In addition to these, they reduced the tonnage of 
warships that was allowed in the Black Sea, they put an imposition of a limitation on the 
duration of passage and a reduction in the extent of the demilitarized zone. They 
achieved their purpose of open and demilitarized Straits, however, which allowed them 
to send a fleet in the shores of Constantinople if needed. This marked the first time that 
the Bosporus Straits were under a complete international control85. Even though the 
British made a great victory in the Lausanne Conference, the Turks also managed to 
avoid dependence to Russia, which was equally important86.   
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                         The Montreux Convention of 1936 
     Since the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the Turks never really looked up to it. It 
was the first time that Turkey had actually no power over the Straits, leaving the 
decisions to the Great Powers87. They believed that it threatened their independence, left 
Istanbul open to attack from the sea and decreased their value in the world of 
international diplomacy. It was only logical that they would eventually try and reverse 
all these negative effects with a new treaty as soon as possible, while in the meantime 
they would try to make the best out of it in order to cope with the current situation. They 
improved the roads in the Straits zone and, outside of it, they installed heavy machine 
guns, they installed ack-ack batteries on mobile carriers and made plans of how to co-
ordinate the military actions of their ground, sea and air forces in the area. When it 
comes to diplomacy, they were often pointing out the dangers that came with the 
demilitarization of the Straits and the little guarantees of safety that they had. In 1932 
the Turks referred to their wish of revision during the League of Nations Conference on 
Reduction and Limitation of Armaments88. It was 1933 when they decided that the 
situation was right in order for them to propose a formal revision of the Lausanne 
treaty89. 
     The Soviets definitely wanted a remilitarization of the Straits so they were in favor 
of such a revision while the British believed that the demilitarization of the Straits was 
to their advantage. The Admiralty, the authority responsible for the British Royal Navy, 
commended in May 1933: 
     If relations became strained between Russia and a Western Power, Russian pressure 
might possibly be brought on Turkey to refuse passage to warships. If the Straits were 
fortified, Turkey could not deny her power to do so; so long, however, as the Straits 
remain unfortified, Turkey could plead her inability to aid Russia in this way. Au 
contraire a fortified Straits would mean a Russo-Turkish Alliance would be of greater 
military value.  
     Further, if it were necessary for a Naval Power to operate in the Black Sea, it would 
be a greater risk to do so with an impregnable Dardanelles and Bosporus on the lines 
of communication than if the Straits were in a demilitarized position.  
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It is exceedingly difficult to judge, in view of modern military weapons and powers of 
transport, to what extent and with what rapidity a demilitarized Straits could be made 
so dangerous as to necessitate the withdrawal of naval forces sent into the Black Sea. 
The risk involved would also depend on the observation that could be kept on the 
demilitarized area so that any dangerous move by Turkey could be parried. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that a fortified Straits could be closed instantly, a 
demilitarized Straits could not. 
     From the above mainly military arguments, it is considered that fortification of the 
Straits still possesses, to a great extent, the disadvantages pointed out by the Chiefs of 
Staff in 192290. Moreover, the question confronting us now is not one of forcing a treaty 
on an unwilling Turkey but of holding Turkey to her treaty obligations91.  
     In the meanwhile, the British were observing if the demilitarization clauses were 
being applied and reporting any unusual movements from the Turkish side, mostly 
about weaponry being carried to the Straits zone92.  
     In 1933, the Turks felt like the chances are in favor of them so they officially raised 
the question of remilitarization of the Straits. They based their hopes on the fact that 
they had signed agreements with many European countries and established good 
relations with most of them. In 1925 they signed a treaty of friendship and neutrality 
with the Soviet Union93, in 1926 they signed a treaty of friendship with Britain, in 1928 
a similar agreement was signed with Italy while France and Greece followed in 1930 
and, in the same year, the treaty of friendship with Russia was renewed. In 1932, 
Turkey was admitted as a member of the League of Nations.  
     So, at the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1933, the Turks raised the question of 
revision which the British rejected immediately94 on the grounds that, Turkey had no 
obligation to keep the Straits open and the Turks could not state that the treaty did not 
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guarantee their security since it clearly stated that “the demilitarization of the Straits 
would not constitute and unjustified danger to the military security of Turkey”95.  
     In 1934, informal approaches were made by the Turkish Government towards the 
United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and the USA, about the need for revision of 
the Straits Convention96. However, it took the Turks three years to raise the question 
again and, by that time, the British could not raise any arguments. Germany, under the 
instructions of Adolf Hitler, started rearming and building up an army during March of 
1935 which was a violation of the Versailles Treaty. In April an agreement was reached 
in Stresa of Italy, between Italy, Britain and France according to which, the Locarno 
Treaties between Italy, Britain, Germany, France and Belgium would be reaffirmed. 
According to these treaties, the signing parties would not attack each other. This was a 
means of stopping Germany from rearming and also a way for Mussolini, the Italian 
Prime Minister, to secure that the other parties would remain neutral in the forthcoming 
occupation of Ethiopia by Italy. However, the Germans managed not only to raise an 
army but also to reoccupy Rhineland. In the meanwhile, Italy invaded and occupied 
Ethiopia which was a violation of the League of Nations Covenant and showed the 
inability of the League to take immediate action in order to avoid military violations by 
its members. Moreover, some international episodes decreased the Turk’s belief and 
trust in international agreements: Bulgaria and Austria had rearmed, which were 
violations of the Treaty of Neuilly and the Treaty of Saint Germen respectively, and 
Italy remilitarized the Dodekanese. So, the Turks were sure that this time no objections 
were going to be raised and this is what actually happened. This time the British, who 
were getting anxious by Italy getting stronger and jeopardizing their position in the 
Mediterranean, were open to making some new friends. Accepting the Turkish 
proposals would lead to better relations between the two countries97. The Soviets, who 
knew that they had to protect their southern shores, were very positive to a revision98. 
     What Turkey had in mind, however, was not a formal question for revision to the 
League of Nations or to the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty, but the notification of 
the signatories of its intentions to militarize the Straits immediately. The Turkish 
intentions were to get equipped with 800 aircrafts in order to be able to defend the 
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Straits in case of an attack from above99. The Turks also had communication with 
Greece in order to reach a mutual agreement of remilitarization. On a note that was 
given from the Turkish Ambassador in Athens to Ioannis Metaxas in the 6th of May 
1936, it was stated that “The militarization of the Greek islands is currently considered 
about Samothrace and Lemnos islands. We fully agree regarding the militarization of 
these two islands at the same time as the Straits. As for the other Greek islands in the 
Aegean Sea, they are the object of the provisions of article 13 of the Treaty of 
Lausanne, referring to the territorial clauses”100. 
      This, however, the British would not approve. They quickly informed the Turkish 
ministers that such an action would be a “breach to the Straits Convention” and the 
Turks soon dropped their plans of quickly remilitarizing the Straits. A formal 
notification that Turkey was ready to negotiate a revision of the Straits Convention, 
especially the part about demilitarization, was sent to the members of the League of 
Nations, Russia and Yugoslavia. The Turkish Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign 
affairs, during a visit to London stated that the articles about the passage of warships 
and aircrafts should also be revised and the Straits Commission should be abolished too. 
He declared that: 
     The Turkish Government hoped to combine the principle of liberty of passage with 
the principle of security by finding a solution which would regulate the passage of 
warships from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea, and from the Black Sea into the 
Mediterranean, in such a way that, while free passage would be assured in all ordinary 
circumstances, the security of Turkey and particularly of such Turkish warships as 
might be in the Sea of Marmora at the time would be assured and any sudden and 
undue accretion of the naval forces of any Power in either the Black Sea or the 
Mediterranean be prevented101.  
      He also stated that any new revisions should not only be applied in times of peace or 
war, but also in times of “menace de guerre” (threat of war), in which case the passage 
of any military ships would be under a de facto Turkish authorization.  
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     The British were not very enthusiastic about the Turkish proposals but they believed 
that a solution could be reached somewhere in the middle so that the British desiderata 
would be satisfied to some point. Although they were not in favor of such revisions, 
they also wanted to befriend the Turks and this made them eager to make a few 
necessary compromises. It was very difficult however, for the British to accept the 
Turkish suggestions about authorization.  
     The Soviets were eager to accept the Turkish proposals for a revision of the Straits 
Convention in hopes of a revision that would be of their best interest. The Soviet Union 
wanted to secure its Black Sea coastline and the industrial zone of Ukraine in case of an 
attack by the fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. Moreover, they believed it was easier to 
control the Straits if they were objected to the authority of Turkey and only, instead of 
the International Straits Commission102. 
     The Turks, being assured that the British would support them on a heavy revision of 
the Straits Convention, arranged for a conference that would be held in Montreux on 22 
June 1936103. The meeting took place in Montreux because Japan objected to Geneva, 
Italy to London and Paris and the Soviets to Lausanne104. A few days earlier, they sent 
their proposals to London, according to which, the demilitarization clauses of the Straits 
Convention should be aborted, civil and military aircrafts would be forbidden to pass 
over the area of the Straits, regulations should be made about the amount of warships 
passing the Straits during times of war, peace and a threat of war. In addition to these, 
the maximum force to be permitted to pass the Straits at once should be limited to 
14,000 tons. If the Turkish fleet was absent at that time then the force would pass the 
Straits in two parts. The total tonnage of all non-riparian fleets assembling in the Black 
Sea at any one time should not exceed 28,000 tons. Warships should pass only with the 
purpose of paying courtesy calls. Turkey should be informed one month in advance of 
their intended passage. None was to remain in the Black Sea for more than fifteen days. 
The regulations governing the passage of the warships of riparian powers from the 
Black Sea to the Mediterranean were to be analogous to those governing the passage of 
the warships of non-riparian powers from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea105.    
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     In the Montreux Convention all the states which had signed the Lausanne Treaty 
were present except for Italy, who thought of the convention to have no reason of 
existence and could be of no actual benefit for them106. The USA saw no reason for 
formal representation, not even for the participation of observers in the Convention107. 
They would accept however the revisions since it would not harm freedom of 
commerce. They considered the problem of the Straits as a “European issue”, and if the 
passage of all merchant ships of all nations was guaranteed then they would be satisfied 
with the result. It would not be until after the end of the Second World War that the 
USA would get actively involved in the matters of the Turkish Straits108. 
     The purpose of the new Convention regarding the Straits was stated to be the desire 
to regulate the transit and navigation in the Straits in a way which would safeguard 
“within the framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the 
riparian States”109. 
     On the first day of the convention, the Turks presented a draft convention which was 
similar to the one sent to the British, with some additions: In a case of war, in which 
Turkey is neutral, warships would have free passage. If Turkey is belligerent, no 
warships were allowed to pass without permission from the Turkish Government and in 
case of a threat of war a similar permission should be obtained, provided that Turkey 
had informed the League of Nations about her intentions to do so. There was also one 
difference: while it was stated in the first draft that the regulations governing the 
passage of warships of riparian powers should be analogous to those governing the 
passage of warships of non-riparian powers, the second draft granted the riparian with 
privileged rights of egress110. 
     While the British were ready to accept the Turkish proposals of the first draft, they 
would not support the official proposals of the second draft because they believed that 
abandoning the principle of reciprocity in favor of Russia, would turn the Black Sea into 
a Russian closed sea. The British stated that if restrictions of passage of warships would 
be imposed, they should be imposed on a reciprocal basis. The British rejection of the 
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Turkish draft was the beginning of a series of debates between them and the Soviets 
about the Straits111. 
     It was no surprise that the Russians viewed the whole subject under a different light. 
M. Litvinov, head of the Soviet delegation, stated enthusiastically that the Soviet Union 
had special interests in the Black Sea. They also had coasts in other parts of the world 
and an immediate necessity might ask for the Soviet fleet to be quickly transferred to 
the Baltic Sea or the Pacific. In addition to that, Litvinov stated that the Black Sea was a 
“closed sea” and not a “high sea” that is open to warships of all nations. There is no 
acceptable purpose of warships entering the Straits, he stated, because “the Black Sea 
leads nowhere”112. Moreover, the French and the Romanians supported this amendment 
because they believed that it would ensure the effective working of the Franco-
Rumanian treaty. The Greeks, even though they primarily cared about commercial 
shipping, alongside with Yugoslavia, they supported France and Russia. The same 
applies for Bulgaria who thought of the conference as a good opportunity to start having 
better relations with the rest of the Balkan countries, and only Japan thought of the 
amendment to be too favorable to the Soviets113.  
     The British delegation had two possibilities in mind: either complete freedom of 
passage for all countries equally, or a limited right of entry and egress, controlled by a 
sliding scale. As the conference progressed, the second solution seemed to be the more 
practical. Turkey soon understood the meaning of the Soviet proposals and they did not 
want to end up with a revision that gave the right to the Soviet Union to transfer through 
the Straits unlimited fleet while there would be major limitation to the non-riparian 
powers that wanted to get in the Black Sea. If this happened, Turkey would end up 
becoming the guardian of a Soviet lake in which the Soviets would organize and 
arrange a powerful fleet. Adopting the scale proposal, the Turks thought it would 
prevent the Soviets from building a large fleet inside the Black Sea. Litvinov was 
acquiescent with this proposal and this allowed the British to start dealing with the other 
proposals of the Turkish draft. They presented their own draft which contained a few 
new proposals: 
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     “A declaration affirming the principle of the freedom of the Straits, which had been 
included in the Lausanne Convention, but omitted from the Turkish draft, should be 
inserted in the preamble; that the maximum naval unit that might pass the Straits at any 
one time should be limited to one half of the tonnage of the Turkish fleet, or to 15,000 
tons, whichever should be the greater; that such limits as were to be enforced should 
note prevent the visit of a fleet of any size to a Turkish port on the invitation of the 
Turkish government, provided that fleet left the Straits the same route by which it 
entered; that the length of notification to the Turkish Government for the passage of 
warships through the Straits should not exceed fifteen days; that the tonnage which any 
one non-riverain power might have in the Black Sea should be limited to three quarters 
of the total tonnage allowed to all non-riverain powers; that if any power, having at the 
time no force in the Black Sea or a force of less than 10,000 tons in all, should wish to 
send a force into that sea “for humanitarian purposes”, that power should have the 
right, subject to special authorization from the Turkish Government, to send ships or to 
increase its existing force in the Black Sea up to a maximum of 10,000 tons, 
notwithstanding all the provisions in the preceding articles; that such a force might 
remain in the Black Sea without limit of time; that forces sent into the Black Sea for any 
other purpose should not remain for longer than one month; that in time of war, should 
Turkey remain neutral, the same conditions should apply to the passage of warships as 
in time of peace, subject to the provision that these conditions should not be applicable 
to a belligerent power to the detriment of its belligerent rights; that Turkey should 
undertake, on the occasion of “menace de guerre”, not only to notify the League of 
Nations and the signatories of the Convention of measures taken, but also, should the 
League decide by a two thirds majority that the measures taken were unjustified, to 
cancel them forthwith; that the Straits Commission should continue to exercise its 
functions; and that the new convention should remain in force for fifty years (as against 
fifteen years in the Turkish draft)”114.    
     A clause that would exclude from the auxiliaries the ships that were designed to 
carry liquids was also incorporated and it was a French proposal that would ensure that 
France’s oil supplies from Romania and Russia would be maintained in case of war.  
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     The sliding scale proposed by the British would work as follows: the total tonnage of 
non-riparian ships sent into the Black Sea should not exceed 30,000 tons, unless and 
until the tonnage of the largest riparian fleet in the Black Sea should come to exceed 
that of the largest fleet in the Black Sea at the time of signature of the Convention by 
more than ten percent. After that point, the total tonnage allowed to non-riparian powers 
should rise pari passu with the excess up to a maximum of 45,000 tons. The Turkish 
proposal for the passage of warships of riparian powers not exceeding a tonnage of 
25,000 tons was abandoned115. 
     The British also, favored the continuation of existence of the International Straits 
Commission. There was a try from the British side to maintain the existence of the 
Commission, at least as an authority with certain technical tasks, like collecting 
statistics, but Turkey managed to persuade the parties of its opposing position. The 
Turkish Government was in charge to continue the duties that were then held by the 
International Straits Commission116. 
     The British draft was soon adopted as the primary basis for the continuation of 
discussions and the Russians soon started showing their discomfort to the British 
proposals. They did not like the fact that Turkey would allow entrance to warships if 
she was neutral to a war and found the numbers of the scale to be unequally favorable to 
the non-riparian powers. They would also never agree on the clause about riparian 
powers sending capital ships through the Straits.  
     The one about the neutrality of Turkey was eventually the one that was most difficult 
to settle. On July 8, the British proposed that if Turkey felt threatened they would have 
the right to close the Straits to all belligerent powers in which the Russians replied with 
another amendment that would ensure the closure of the Straits in case Turkey remained 
neutral in a war. The dispute was so intense that, at some point, it looked like the 
conference would end because of the disagreement. The British, however, proposed a 
compromising position that the Soviets and the French accepted: 
     “Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall… not pass through the Straits 
except in cases arising out of the application of article 23 of the present Convention, 
and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty 
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of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant 
of the League of Nations117”. 
     Once this obstacle was passed, the delegations were able to quickly move on and 
agree to the other amendments too. They agreed that in the preamble of article 1 of the 
final text, the principle of freedom of navigation should be maintained. In time of peace, 
freedom of passage was guaranteed for light surface vessels, minor war vessels and 
auxiliary vessels. The capital ships of riparian powers were exempted from this 
regulation only if they would pass singly during daytime. Submarines that were 
constructed or bought outside the Black Sea, in transit to a base in that sea, would also 
be exempted if they passed singly, during daytime and on the surface. The period of 
notice required to be sent to the Turkish Government for the passage of warships was 
eight days but in case of non Black Sea power it was preferable to be fifteen days. The 
maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces in the course of transit through 
the Straits (except in the case of the capital ships of riparian powers) should not exceed 
15,000 tons. The upper limit of the aggregate tonnage of non-riparian fleets allowed in 
the Black Sea in peace time was to be 30,000 tons, unless and until the tonnage of the 
strongest Black Sea fleet had exceeded by 10,000 tons that of the strongest Black Sea 
fleet at the time of the signature of the Convention. This limit was to rise pari passu 
with any further excess up to a maximum of 45,000 tons. The proportion of that tonnage 
which any one power might have in the Black Sea was limited to two thirds. The 
clauses about ships entering the Straits for humanitarian purposes were maintained but 
their tonnage should not exceed 8,000 tons. If the additional force should bring the 
aggregate tonnage in the Black Sea up to a figure in excess of the limit imposed in the 
“escalator” clause, it should only be sent into that sea on condition that the riparian 
powers raised no objection to its dispatch. Vessels of war belonging to non-riparian 
powers were not to remain in the Black Sea for more than twenty one days, no matter 
what the purpose of their presence there. Naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed 
for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid, were not to be required to notify the 
Turkish government in advance for their passage, nor to be counted in the calculation of 
total tonnage. They were, however, to be subject to all the other regulations laid down 
for the passage of warships through the Straits. The Straits Commission would be 
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abandoned and the Convention was to remain in force for twenty years, which is until 
the year 1956118.  
     The Turks had the right to remilitarize the demilitarized zone immediately119, even 
before the actual signing of the Convention. The Greeks too remilitarized the islands of 
Lemnos and Samothrace, to the discomfort of Turkey which supports that the Montreux 
Convention states remilitarization of only the Turkish grounds however the Convention 
states clearly that the Montreux Conventions replaces the Lausanne Conference120.  
     All participating parties thought of the results of the Montreux convention as very 
satisfying. Mr. Litvinoff stated on the matter: 
“It seems to me that all who have participated in this Conference will depart satisfied, 
and that there would be no malcontents. The Conference has given absent states no 
reason for dissatisfaction, and their peaceful interests have been fully respected121”.   
     The Montreux Convention was signed on the 20th of July122 and comprises 29 
articles, 4 annexes and one Protocol. The signatory parties were Turkey, Great Britain, 
Bulgaria, France, Greece, Japan, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Italy 
adhered later (in 1938) since the Convention was open to adhesion for all the states that 
had signed the Lausanne Treaty123.    
     Many of the provisions of the Montreux Convention display the concerns of the 
Powers at the time of its signing. Turkey and the Soviet Union were concerned about an 
attack from the aggressive states of Italy and Germany. Especially the Soviets were 
afraid of a union between Italy, Germany and Great Britain against the socialist state124.      
     The Montreux Convention displays the new status of the Turkish state in the world 
of diplomacy. Turkey takes back the leading control of the Straits and is once again 
allowed to remilitarize the area, therefore increased her security125. Although Turkey is 
the sole guardian of the Straits, however it must exercise its control according to the 
obligations of the League of Nations. The Soviets were also satisfied with the 
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Convention. Now the Soviet Union is allowed to send warships into the Aegean and the 
Mediterranean almost without restriction, while powers who desire to pass into the 
Black Sea are objects of heavy restrictions. This Convention marks a new beginning in 
the relationship between the Soviets and Turkey and is of great political, and not only 
legal, significance126 
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                        The 1945 Crisis over the Straits 
     Not that much time passed until the Soviets sought a new revision of the Montreux 
Convention. The Soviet Union was getting stronger by the day, in the 1rst of September 
1939 Germany invaded Poland and the Second World War was about to begin. By 1939 
the Montreux Convention looked like it did not correspond to the new reality. When the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed in August of 1939, the Soviet Foreign Minister 
Molotov informed the Germans of the Soviet intentions to revise the regime of the 
Straits and establish military bases in Turkey127. 
      In 22 of September 1939, the Turkish Prime Minister Sukru Saracoglu went to 
Moscow to discuss the signing of a treaty with the Soviets. Molotov and Stalin made it 
very clear that what they wanted, among other things, was a revision of the Montreux 
Convention. Specifically, they asked for was that the Soviets and the Turks should 
decide together if a ship of a non-riparian country would be allowed to enter the Black 
Sea. When Saracoglu rejected even discussing the proposal, a second proposal was 
made. This was that the Turks would be the only state that would decide whether a ship 
would pass or not through the Straits, eliminating the League of Nations. Such thing 
would cause Turkey to lose its western allies, putting her in the hands of the Soviets. 
Saracoglu was once more negative and nothing was decided128.  
     When the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were discussing about spheres of 
influence, during the last months of 1940, the USSR repeated many times that it 
considered Bulgaria and the Turkish straits as of being of great importance to its 
security zone. Both Germany and the Soviet Union came to an agreement that the 
Montreux Convention of 1936 was outdated and didn’t respond to the current political 
map. The Soviets wanted to establish a military base in the Dardanelles, in order to 
control the exit and entrance of the Black Sea. If Turkey was reluctant to such a 
decision, the USSR would not hesitate to proceed to the necessary military and 
diplomatic actions to take what it wanted129. The Turkish side was aware of the Soviet 
claims, from the talks they had at the fall of 1939 and because Hitler had informed the 
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Turks130.The Soviet pressure on Turkey was getting stronger and stronger as time 
passed by. 
     During the greatest part of the Second World War Turkey maintained a neutral 
position. However, although the Montreux Convention forbid the Turks from allowing 
any warships to pass through the Straits, the merchant vessels were heavily armed 
during the War. This would be used by the Axis powers in order to pass merchant ships 
with weaponry and ammunition through the Straits, while the Turks would look the 
other way131. On June 1944 the German ship Kassel would be searched by the British, 
only for them to find out that it was carrying weaponry132 and caused the forced 
resignation of the Turkish Foreign Minister Numan Menemencioglu. All these were 
noticed by the Soviets. 
      Eventually, with the end of the Second World War and the inclusion of Romania 
and, mainly, Bulgaria, to the Soviet sphere of influence, the Turks could not help but get 
more worried. First, they sought help from Greece, who was also feeling the Soviet 
pressure and, in that sense, they had some common interests in their foreign policy.  On 
July 24 of 1944, the Turkish Ambassador to the Greek government, which at that time 
was in Cairo of Egypt, informed a Greek diplomat that Turkey was eager to conduct 
friendship with Greece in terms of foreign policy. He said that the USSR is clearly 
following a tsarist imperialistic policy and that the two countries should stand up, with 
the help of Yugoslavia, Britain and the USA133 . 
     On October 9 of the same year, Churchill and Stalin were deciding the fate of the 
Balkan countries in the Kremlin. It was during these talks that Stalin informed Churchill 
of his intentions to revise the Montreux Convention in order for Soviet ships to be able 
to go in and out the Black Sea at any time134. They agreed that the US government 
should be informed too and specific proposals from the Soviets should be sent to them. 
The Soviets, however, did not send anything regarding the Turkish straits for the next 
few months. In the meanwhile, Turkey got informed about the Soviet aspirations and 
started negotiating with the British and the Americans.  
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     At February 10, at Yalta during a conference between the three Great Powers, Stalin 
once again stated that the Montreux Convention was outdated and modification was 
required in order to be in pace with the foreign affairs of that time. It was not the first 
time Stalin referred to the problem of the Straits, since he discussed about it with 
Roosevelt at Tehran during November of 1943135. At the time when it was signed, the 
Soviet Union was weak and faced many threats but at that current time it did not 
represent the present relations, and also the participation of hostile Japan in the 
Convention was bigger than that of the Soviet Union136. For Stalin and the Soviets, it 
was not a matter of question to accept a regime where Turkey “had a hand on the throat 
of the USSR”137 since Turkey had the right to close the Straits in case of war or if it felt 
threatened. A solution should be reached, which would not threaten Turkey’s security 
and interests. Although Roosevelt preferred to sidetrack since he did not have any 
specific opinion on the matter, Churchill agreed that changes ought to be made. It was 
decided that the three Great Powers (the Soviets, the British and the USA) would 
discuss the matter with their respective foreign ministers and inform Turkey of their 
conclusions when time was right138.  
     On the 21st of March, 1945, the Soviets renounced the Treaty of Friendship and 
Neutrality which had signed with Turkey in 1925. According to that treaty, each one of 
the countries involved would maintain a neutral position in case the other party is under 
military attack by one or more powers. In addition to that, none of the parties would 
sign any political agreements with third parties that were against the second party (if 
this treaty was still active, Turkey’s accession to NATO in 1952 would have been a lot 
harder, from a legal point of view)139. The Soviets stated:  
“It is declared that the Soviet Government acknowledging the value of the Soviet – 
Turkish Treaty of December 17, 1925, in the cause of maintaining the friendly relations 
between the Soviet Union and Turkey, nevertheless considers it necessary to assert that 
owing to deep changes which have taken place particularly in the course of the Second 
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World War, this treaty no longer corresponds to the new situation and requires serious 
improvement”140. 
     The Turkish side accepted this as a Soviet move that purposes to solve the matter of 
the Straits as a concern of solely the Black Sea countries. They believed that the Soviets 
would ask for bilateral discussions between them and Turkey, in order to eliminate the 
British and American influence in the area. The Turks were prepared to discuss 
alternations in the Montreux Convention, as long as their interests and security were not 
threatened but would never give in to the Soviet pressure about military bases and 
territory aspirations. 
     The renunciation of the treaty of Friendship showed that the Soviets would not only 
pursue their objectives with diplomacy, but they would also use any measure possible in 
order to put pressure on the Turks. The Soviet propaganda was constantly referring to 
the Montreux Convention as threatening for its security, while they would often refer to 
the fact that the Turks co-operated with the Germans141 (they let German ships pass 
through the Straits during the Second World War). At the same time, there were rumors 
of Soviet troops in Bulgaria moving towards the Turkish borders142. 
     On June 7, as a result of the Turkish anxiety for the signing of a new Treaty of 
Friendship, Molotov received the Turkish ambassador for discussion. However, 
according to Molotov, there were a few matters that had to be discussed before signing 
any new treaty143.  
     First of all, there was the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1921. The Soviets demanded the 
return of the territories of Kars and Ardahan to them. The Turkish ambassador denied 
discussing with Molotov any territorial issues which would affect the integrity of his 
country. Molotov agreed to put this issue aside as “unresolved” and proceeded to 
discussing the Straits question. He stated that the Soviets recognized the fact that 
Turkey had acted well and with good intentions during the Second World War, but a 
country like the Soviet Union could not base its security on the intentions of a country 
like Turkey, neither did they believe that the Turks could guarantee the security of the 
Straits. The Turkish Ambassador, very forwardly, asked if Molotov is asking about 
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establishing military bases inside Turkey and, when he received a positive answer, he 
refused to make any further discussions. Molotov stated that it was better for the two 
sides to solve this issue alone, instead of having to resort to an international conference 
but the Turks clearly preferred the international way, since they didn’t believe that they 
could deal with the Soviet pressure without the support of other Great Powers144.   
     The British and the Americans were surprised when they got informed about all 
these by the Turks, since they were still waiting for the Soviet views on the issue of the 
Straits as they agreed during the conference in Yalta. The Turks contacted the US 
Ambassador and asked for his country’s views on the above mentioned dialogue. The 
Turks were afraid that their firm stance would cause another wave of Soviet pressure 
and propaganda against them.  
     Another discussion was made between Molotov and Ambassador Sarper, on June 18, 
where the Turks maintained their firm stance and said that the points made by Molotov 
were out of discussion. The Turks feared that the purpose of the Soviet pressure was the 
eventual satellization of Turkey, especially since Molotov was frequently referring to 
the new treaty as being similar to those being made with Poland and other Eastern 
countries145. They believed that the USSR, occupying a huge percentage of the planet’s 
total territory, didn’t really need the two regions from Turkey, even though official 
Soviet response was that they were needed for the Armenian Soviet Republic which had 
very little space. The Americans believed however, that the USSR had in mind of 
expanding its sphere of influence to Iran and Iraq and, eventually, to the Persian Gulf, 
therefore the territorial claims. The Turks soon contacted with the US, requesting for 
help but the US were reluctant to take any position prior to the Potsdam Conference, 
which was a meeting that would be held between the three Great Powers after British 
request146.   
     The Soviets kept on moving forces towards the Turkish and Greek frontiers and the 
Turks were asking for American help even more demandingly. In meetings with 
American diplomats, the Turks were establishing the fact that they would discuss about 
the revision of the Montreux Conference and would allow minimal territorial changes 
but nothing of a great magnitude. The US, however were unmoved prior to the 
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conference, even though premier Saracoglou characteristically talked about how Turkey 
was endangered to be even annexed to the Soviet Union. 
     The USA had no specific objectives in that part of the world. It recognized the role 
of the “watcher” in a battle between Soviet and British interests, ready to intervene if 
and when things got out of hand. America’s purpose has always been the existence of 
stable peace in Europe, in order to conduct business with the European countries. In the 
Potsdam conference, the US would not tolerate any decision threatening Turkey’s 
independence.  
     This did not mean, however, that they were not prepared. On the contrary, since 
1943, the American State Department acknowledged the Dardanelles as a point of 
future interest and started examining what alternatives were there to secure American 
interests and solve the matter. They reached four possible conclusions and solutions: 
keep going on with the current arrangements of the Montreux Convention, 
internationalize the Straits, increase Russian control over the Straits and apportion 
control among all Black Sea countries. Russian control of the Straits was the least 
desirable since it would make the Black Sea a Soviet lake and control among all Black 
Sea countries would have the same effect, since the Soviet Union, as the strongest 
player in that game, would easily gain control. Internationalization, on the other hand, 
seemed as a more desirable solution for the States but harder to achieve. Turkey would 
not accept a solution that takes away its rights on the Straits and the Soviets would not 
agree with a decision that did not guarantee that they would have the primary role in the 
region. Moreover, a decision like that would put pressure on internationalizing other 
waterways, like the Suez Canal and Panama. It seemed that the retention of the 
Montreux Convention was the only possible solution that would actually work out147.  
The Americans had already studied and reached these conclusions since 1943, while 
Roosevelt was still president.  
     The British, on the other hand, by July 1945 started pointing out to the Soviets that 
they are “very much surprised by the… territorial claims and demands for bases in the 
straits, since these activities could not be regarded as exclusively Turko-Soviet 
matters”148 . Territorial claims should be examined by the United Nations and the 
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Straits question affected aspects of the Montreux Convention which was not bilateral 
but was signed by many parties. In addition to that, it was agreed at Yalta that the 
Soviets would contact the US and British governments before making any demands to 
Turkey and that the whole issue should be discussed in Potsdam. The British in general 
thought that the Soviet demand for passage at all times was logical but would strongly 
oppose to any Soviet bases being set up in Turkey. Apart from the fact that Russian 
ships sailing freely into the Mediterranean would threaten the British power and 
dominance in the area, the setting of military bases would threaten the lines of 
communication between Britain and her Asian empire, mainly India149. The US would 
be reluctant, however, to have such a firm stance in the matter of the military bases, 
since it was negotiating the setting of military camps in Brazil, Portugal and Ecuador.  
     Potsdam, a suburb for German officials just a little further away from Berlin, was 
selected as a reminder of the Allied power and victory. The American delegates would 
stroll around ruined Berlin discussing about the fate of Adolf Hitler150.  
     The Potsdam Conference started at the 12th of July, one day after the first successful 
detonation of an atomic bomb in New Mexico. Although in the 17th of July Truman 
stated that “Stalin wanted the Black Sea Straits for Russia, as had all the czars before 
him” and “Churchill was determined that Britain should keep and even strengthen the 
control over the Mediterranean”151, the question of the Straits was not discussed until 
the 22nd of the same month. It was Churchill who first raised the question during the 
plenary meeting of that day. He said that his side was ready to accept modifications in 
the Montreux Convention which would allow the movement of Russian ships through 
the Straits and the whole discussion would be on a friendly basis. He, however, stressed 
to Stalin that importance of not alarming Turkey who was suspicious of the movements 
of Soviet and Bulgarian troops near the Bulgarian borders and the constant attacks in 
the Soviet press and radio, as well as his discomfort about the prior discussions between 
Turkish and Soviet diplomats152. Mr. Molotov responded by claiming that the Turks 
approached the Soviets for an alliance but the Soviets demanded two conditions: the 
annexation of the Turkish territory that once belonged to the Armenian and Georgian 
SSR and the revision of the Montreux Convention. He stated that the Convention did 
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not correspond to the present situation and that the rights of the Soviet Union were 
equal to those of Japan153. He had also informed the Turks that if they did not agree, the 
Union was ready to reach an agreement alone with the other Black Sea powers. When 
Churchill asked Molotov if what he wants is Soviet military bases in the Straits, 
Molotov responded by referring to the treaties of 1805 and 1833, which were the closest 
that the Russians ever got to closing the Straits issue for good, to their advantage 
without external influences, proposed that the matter of the Straits should be the 
business of Turkey and the USSR and the Montreux Convention should be revised “in 
the proper regular procedure”. President Truman stated he has not an opinion on the 
matter and asked for delaying this conversation for a day which was agreed.  
     On the plenary meeting of the next day, the Straits were brought up again. Churchill 
made it very clear that Britain would not tolerate Soviet bases on Turkish grounds and 
the Turks would not agree anyway. Stalin stated that the Turks had nothing to be afraid 
of and that the information about Soviet troops on Bulgaria were wrong since there 
were less Soviet troops in Bulgaria than British soldiers in Greece154. He continued by 
stating that the Soviets only claimed a little piece of land, which would not have been 
brought up if the Turks did not ask for an alliance. An alliance means protecting each 
other’s frontiers but the frontiers to the parts of Kars and Ardahan were incorrect155. 
Stalin repeated the well-known argument that a little country like Turkey, with the 
British help and support, was holding the Soviet Union by the throat, since it could 
close the Straits not only in cases of war but also when and if it felt threatened, and that 
was something that had to change and called it “a ridiculous situation”156. Stalin also 
said that it would be very uncomfortable for Britain and the USA, if similar agreements 
were made for Gibraltar or the Suez and Panama canals. Turkey, he stated, was too 
weak of a country to guarantee safe passage of Soviet ships at all times and to deny the 
entrance to possible hostile ships157. If they could not have a base in Turkey, there 
should be another base near the Straits through which the Soviets would defend them.  
    Then it was turn for the US president H. Truman to take the speech. He proposed of a 
free waterway guaranteed by all the Great Powers. Since all the European wars, in the 
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last two hundred years, happened in the area between the Black and Baltic Seas and 
from France to Russia, it was in the hands of the great powers to not let that happen 
again158. Free passage would correspond not only to the Black Sea but also to the 
Danube and Rhine waterways, guaranteed by international authorities that would 
represent all powers. These authorities would restore and develop navigation facilities 
and guarantee equal protection for all participant nations. He said that he didn’t want to 
participate in another discussion about the Straits or Danube in 25 years159. The idea for 
this came to Truman because of similar problems to the Danube River and the proposal 
of the State Department for an authority composed by the United States, Britain, France, 
the Soviet Union and the riparian states. The problem in Danube was, however, a 
commercial one, while in the Dardanelles it was a matter of security160. Truman’s 
proposal was out of spirit with the Soviet needs. Churchill once more stated that he also 
wanted a revision of the Montreux Convention and Truman’s proposal was on the right 
track, however Stalin needed a day to analyze the American proposals. 
     During the next plenary meeting, Stalin stated that it was impossible to reach an 
agreement since their points of view were so different and should perhaps move on to 
discussing the next item of the conference’s agenda161. A solution like the American 
proposal was undesirable by the Soviets since they did not only want free exit to the 
Mediterranean, they also wanted to control who goes in the Black Sea and be able to 
close the Straits at will. Free access to the Black Sea would mean that Russia’s Southern 
shores were vulnerable to the aggressive appetites of other powers, while exit through 
the Black Sea was very significant for the Union’s economy since it was the outlet for 
the natural reserves of Caucasus and the grain of Ukraine. Having a state in which 
everyone can get in or out at all times would only satisfy one of those needs. 
      Churchill once more supported that the guarantee of the Great Powers would be a 
substitute for military bases and the Soviets asked him if he would like the Suez Canal 
to be under the same principle. Churchill responded that the Suez Canal has worked for 
70 years without complaints, only to find Molotov’s respond to “ask Egypt about 
complaints”162. A solution was not reached and it was decided that each of the three 
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governments would make separate talks with Turkey. Stalin did, however, propose to 
Churchill, on the sidelines of the meeting, the setting of Soviet military bases in 
Alexandroupoli, if he would not be allowed to do so near the Sea of Marmara163.  
     What was agreed at the Potsdam Conference is that the Montreux Convention should 
be revised and each of the three participating countries would make their own talks with 
Turkey. As the protocol of the Conference stated:  
The three Governments recognized the need for revision of the Convention of the Straits 
concluded at Montreux as failing to meet present day conditions.  
It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct 
conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government164.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
                             
                                                          
163
 Nikolaou 1995 p. 83 
164
 Alvarez 1980 p. 66 
52 
 
                 The Straits after the Potsdam Conference 
     Although the Potsdam Conference did not actually turn out to bring any major 
changes or results, it is considered as a turning point to the foreign relations of that time. 
President Truman showed that the US was ready to take a leading role in the final 
solution of the problem and act more actively on the issues of Eastern Europe. The 
Soviets were seeing the US as an obstacle to their ambitions, while Britain as an ally to 
maintain their dominance in the Mediterranean for the same exact reasons. The Turks of 
course, were more than pleased with America’s interaction to the matters of the Straits, 
since they always considered it as a trustful ally and that is why they tried to involve the 
US in the case from the very beginning165. 
     After the Conference, it was expected by Turkey and Britain that the US would take 
the initiative to start negotiations and lead the problem to an end. The US however, was 
not active, and as the Soviet pressure was continuing on Turkey, the latter were getting 
anxious that the Americans would step back to their previous policy of non 
involvement. What was actually happening was that the American State Department and 
president Truman could not reach an agreement, since their opinions differed and the 
State Department did not take internationalization into consideration at all.  
     On November 2, 1945 Ambassador Wilson passed the American note on the 
Dardanelles to the Turkish foreign minister. The note included a review of the Potsdam 
discussions and stated that they proposed a solution which “ will promote international 
security, will show due consideration for the interest of Turkey and all Black Sea 
riparian powers, and will assure the free use of this important waterway to the 
commerce of all nations”166. It stressed American will to participate in another 
international conference to resolve the issue and concluded that  
“The Government of the United States is of the opinion that a revision of the Montreux 
Convention undertaken to meet changed world conditions should be based on the 
following principles: 
The Straits to be open to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times. 
The Straits to be open to the transit of warships of Black Sea powers at all times. 
Save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits to be 
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denied to the warships of non - Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific 
consent of the Black Sea powers or except when acting under authority of the United 
Nations. 
Certain changes to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution of the 
United Nations system for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as 
a signatory”167 
     The responses to the American suggestions varied. The British agreed that the 
Montreux Convention needed to be revised but believed it was better if that would 
happen during an international conference. Turkey was also reluctant, since it 
considered the proposal to be very beneficial for the Soviets and it would make them 
lose their strategic advantage over them. They did acknowledge, however, the fact that 
the American proposals were much milder than those of the Soviets. They agreed with 
the general spirit of the note but reserved commenting on the proposals since they were 
afraid of a Soviet gathering of the fleet at the Straits. This, they noted, should be a 
concern for all the powers that have interests in the Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet 
Union was even more cautious. They were thoughtful that Turkey alone was too weak 
to guarantee that, in a case of war, they could deny the entry of hostile war ships. 
Without such a guarantee, Russian security was not assured. The only guarantee for 
such concerns was the establishment of Soviet military bases at the Dardanelles. 
Although these responses were not official, the Americans understood that the Soviets 
were not pleased with their proposals.  
     Not much happened regarding the Straits from the Soviet side either. For about a 
year, to the surprise of Britain and the USA, no official contact between the Soviet 
Union and Turkey took place. Although the Soviet pressure on Turkey (and Greece) 
was not reduced168, no formal theses were delivered to the Turkish side. With five more 
years remaining until no more amendments to the Montreux Convention could be made, 
the Soviets did not push too hard towards that direction, although they insisted on their 
demands about the Straits and the annexation of the Kars and Adrahan areas. On 7th of 
August 1946, the Soviets sent to the Turkish foreign ministry their views and proposals 
on the Straits regime169. Again, no changes were made to the Soviet policy and 
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demands: they asked for exclusion of all non-Black Sea military powers, exclusion of 
any role of the US as well as the revision of the convention and military bases on 
Turkish grounds. More specifically, they asked for opening of the Straits to all merchant 
ships at all times, opening of the Straits to the warships of Black Sea countries at all 
times, restricted passage of the non – Black Sea warships, establishment of a new 
regime under the control of Turkey and the Black Sea powers and a joint defense 
system. 
     Ankara sent an anxious message to Washington asking for advice170 and the USA 
was the first to react to the Soviet proposals. They believed that the Soviet note to 
Turkey showed a desire for the eventual control and domination of Turkey, with instant 
consequences to the Middle East. On August 19, they sent a note to the Soviets, stating 
once again their opinion that the revision of the Montreux Convention was not an issue 
to be solved solely by the Black Sea countries. They decided that they had to “resist 
with all means at our disposal any Soviet aggression and in particular, because the case 
of Turkey would be so clear, any Soviet aggression against Turkey… The United States 
would not hesitate to join other nations in meeting armed aggression by the force of 
American arms”171. On the note sent to the Soviets, it was stated that “Turkey should 
continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits… Should the Straits 
become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation 
would constitute a threat to national security and would clearly be a matter for action 
on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations”172. This was followed by the 
notes sent to the Soviets by Britain and Turkey at 21 and 22 of August respectively. The 
order of the notes sent to the Soviets was not random. It represented the new role of the 
US as the leading country in the effort to prevent the Soviet expansion. It represented 
the changes that happened in the Great Power’s relations since about a year before and 
was the harbinger of the Truman doctrine that would follow and the beginning of the 
Cold War173.   
     The problem of the Turkish Straits was once again brought up during the Paris Peace 
Conference, at October 10, when Molotov made once more the parallelism between the 
Straits and the Suez and Panama Canals, accusing the British policy of being 
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imperialistic. On 18th of October, Turkey once again rejected the Soviet proposals, 
reaffirming the fact that they would be eager to revise the Montreux Convention but 
would not accept military bases on the Dardanelles or even a regime of joint defense 
system. In the meanwhile, the US Government was weighing the Soviet’s moves and 
came to the conclusions that their main objective was the eventual control of Turkey. 
The Soviets would use Turkey as an obstacle for those wishing to attack their grounds, 
and as a means of expansion towards the Mediterranean, the Near East and Middle East.  
     The US recognized that, from a strategic point of view, Turkey was the most 
important state in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Turkey’s geographical 
position makes it the most efficient point in which Soviet expansion to the Middle East 
could take place or be stopped. A satellization of Turkey would eventually mean that 
the next steps of Russian expansion would be Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine, 
Transjordan, Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, all of which were out of Soviet influence 
at that time. It would also have the same consequences in Greece and Iran, which were 
struggling against the Soviet influence. None of these countries had a state as stable as 
Turkey did, which made Turkey the most efficient candidate to put an ending in those 
plans of expansion174. 
     The Turkish Government proposed the creation of a security arrangement between 
Turkey, the USA, the Soviet Union and Britain for defense in the Straits in case of war, 
and hoped that the Soviets would prove to be reasonable. The Soviet pressure on Turkey 
was creating a large financial burden in that country and, if a settlement could not be 
reached quickly, they would soon have to look for financial aid since they could not 
keep carrying the burden for ever.  
     However, the Soviet pressure on Turkey and Greece kept going on and was even 
magnified during late 1946 and 1947. On the 9th of January 1947, the American 
ambassador in Moscow informed President Truman that the Soviets were about to begin 
with a new wave of diplomatic activities, regarding the Turkish Straits175.  The 
American response to the situation in Greece and Turkey was the Truman Doctrine on 
March 12, 1947. The Truman Doctrine was an American foreign policy, according to 
which financial assistance would be given to Turkey and Greece in order to prevent 
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them from falling to Soviet hands. President Truman gave a speech on live television 
that was broadcast in several countries of the world, in which he asked for the Congress 
to provide Greece and Turkey with 400 million dollars for financial aid and military 
supplies and equipment. On May 22, President Truman signed Public Law 75, 
according to which “the national integrity and survival of Greece and Turkey were of 
importance to the security of the United States and of all freedom-loving peoples176”. 
     On April 19, 1950, the Soviet naval organ Krasnii Flot declared that the Montreux 
Convention should be revised since it had ceased to accord with the interests of the 
Black Sea powers. The Soviet Union, however, did not raise the question of revision in 
1951 although they could have done so, according to article 29 of the Convention. On 
February 15, 1952, Greece and Turkey both joint NATO and took another big step away 
from Soviet pressure and towards Western influence. General of the Army, Omar 
Bradley, discussed the significance of Turkey stating that “Turkey, astride the Bosporus 
and Dardanelles, guards the approach by water from the Black Sea to the 
Mediterranean and to Suez Canal and Egypt farther south. Turkey, too, flunks the land 
routes from the North to the strategically important oil fields of the Middle East” and 
continued stating ```````````````````````````````````````that the evidence of these countries’ 
importance were “in the intensive efforts of international communism to bring Greece 
under Soviet domination, and in efforts of Russia, extending almost 200 years, to gain 
control of the Turkish Straits”177.  
     On May 30, 1953, Molotov informed the Turkish Government that the Soviet Union 
was reconsidering its relations with its neighboring countries, and especially with 
Turkey. He informed them that the States of Georgia and Armenia, and consequently 
the Soviet Union, could now renounce their territorial claims over Turkey. The Turks 
replied on the 18th of July stating that they were satisfied with the note, they would also 
like to seek good relations and that “the question of the Black Sea Straits, was regulated 
by provisions of the Montreux Convention”178. On July 20, the Soviets sent one more 
note to Turkey, in which they complained about the nature of the Turko-American 
relations and the visit of 10 American and 22 British warships in Istanbul during July of 
that year. This was considered “a kind of military demonstration”. The Turks replied 
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that they were just courtesy visits and the Soviets pointed out that in 1950, 1951 and 
1952, 33, 49 and 61 warships had visited Turkey respectively, while on the first seven 
months of 1953 the number had already reached 60. It was evident that Turkey was now 
under full western influence and the Soviet aspiration of getting control of the Straits 
was further than ever.  
     The Soviets, once again, did not ask for a revision of the Convention on 9 November 
1954, although they could do so according to article 28. It was very doubtful that they 
could achieve their goals now and, furthermore, the advances in weapon technology 
made the Straits easier to control from a distance with the new weaponry and missiles 
that were invented179. Not much happened ever since. In 1957, from August to October, 
during the Syrian crisis, Turkey was once more under pressure from the Soviets, 
similarly to 1945-46. There was no change of policy considering the Straits between 
Turkey and the US, not even after the 1960 coup d’etat. The Soviets did not stop being 
displeased by the constant American presence in the Straits, but the US would also refer 
to their right to act that way, according to article 18 of the Montreux Convention, and 
would send two destroyers or frigates in the spring and fall of each year. This, of course, 
worked as a reminder of the signed treaties and worked as maintenance of their 
functionality.      
     The constant challenges coming from the ever growing Soviet fleet, led to the 
creation of MARAIRMED (Maritime Air Forces in the Mediterranean) with the 
participation of the US, Britain, France and Italy by NATO. During the Korean War, 
Turkey could refuse passage of warships since it was a country at war, but refused to do 
so in order to not raise an issue of revision again. Neither did they forbid entry to the 
Black Sea to the American fleet during the Vietnam War, with the excuse that the US 
were not in a war but were supporting a side. The US, at first declared that the 
Montreux Convention does not apply to them since they had not signed it, but later they 
adopted the Turkish excuses180. As years passed by, the interpretation of the Convention 
has been becoming more and more elastic, since new weapons, especially nuclear, were 
being created that the Convention did not mention.  
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     Even though decades have passed, the Montreux Convention is still in full use until 
our days, although some changes need to be made in order for it to be on the same page 
with today’s world. These changes have nothing to do with security though. The 
increase in traffic through the Straits since 1936 is huge. This has led to an increase of 
accidents, especially with oil tankers, and nobody would like an ecological catastrophe 
right on the shores of Constantinople. The sea pollution has already reached a new peak 
in the area.  
      Article 2 of the Montreux Convention states that any merchant vessel enjoys 
freedom of passage any part of the day and that Turkish pilotage is optional. That might 
have worked in 1936 but now there cannot be such unlimited freedom of passage. In 
1994 the Turkish Government introduced a new “Maritime Traffic Regulation for the 
Turkish Straits and the Marmara Region” in order to cope with these dangers181. During 
November 1998 new regulations replaced those of 1994 due to Russian concerns. The 
new regulations are simpler and deal more thoroughly with freedom of passage182.   
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                                       Conclusions 
     It is clear that, ever since the creation of Russia and its annexation of the northern 
shores of the Black Sea, the Bosporus Straits have been of great importance to her. We 
have seen that the policy of Russia and the Soviet Union regarding the Straits has been 
changing, based on the conditions that she was facing each time. When she was feeling 
weak, like during the Conference of Lausanne, Russia would prefer the Straits to be 
closed for warships in order for her to establish her security. When she felt, however, 
that she needs to expand and be on the offensive side, the opening of the Straits was 
what she would be trying to achieve. Of course, since Russia could not call for a new 
international treaty every time her interests changed, she would have preferred to 
acquire the Straits, like the Tsarist Russia did, or place them in her zone of influence, 
like Stalin tried to do after the Second World War. Despite their passionate tries, the last 
years of Stalin marked the last efforts the Russians made in order to acquire control over 
the Straits. Ever since 1952, Turkey has proven to be an ally to the Westerners and the 
Montreux Convention of 1936 is the longest living international regime that the 
Dardanelles ever had.  
     Turkey on the other hand, seems to be an object in the hands of the Great Powers 
ever since the Ottoman Empire began its decay. She used to be the one and only 
undisputed controller of the Straits and the Black Sea in general, until Catherine the 
Great managed to obtain the Crimean peninsula. Since the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, 
the Ottoman Empire was facing way too many problems inside the lands of the Empire, 
and it was very difficult to handle them all at once. The rise of nationalism and the 
revolts this brought inside her territory and the constant wars made the, once great, 
Empire a weak state. This resulted in other powers taking control of the matters of the 
Straits, like the Potsdam Conference in which Turkey was not even invited. What 
Turkey sought, when it came to the Straits, was to be in control of who passes through 
them and for most of the time this was accomplished. Losing that privilege meant that 
she would lose her most significant advantage in the world of diplomacy and would 
soon be forced to be annexed or join the sphere of influence of Russia and, later, the 
Soviet Union.  
     From the other powers that played a role in the matters of the Bosporus Straits, Great 
Britain played the most important role since here presence of her fleet in the 
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Mediterranean was constant. What she opted for was open Straits that would allow her 
commercial ships to enter the Black Sea and, on the same time, some regulations 
regarding the exit of warships from the Straits, since she would not like to see the 
Russian fleet entering the Mediterranean at will. On the other hand, she would like to 
have to ability to approach Constantinople easily and take action if she saw a chance of 
obtaining the control of the Straits would appear. From that point of view, befriending 
the Ottoman Empire was the best choice and that’s how Britain acted most of the time, 
although after the First World War she started questioning that choice.  
     The USA on the other hand, for a large part of the 20th century, had a policy of non 
involvement. As long as her commercial interests in the Black Sea were not harmed, 
they would not take any formal position regarding the Straits. This changed after the 
Second World War when they saw in the Soviet Union a great enemy. This led to the 
matters of the Straits being of importance to the USA too, since they would not like any 
revisions that would strengthen their great opponent. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s 
actions regarding the Straits made the US President Truman take a more firm stance and 
get involved seriously in the matters of Europe. 
     For more than two centuries, the “Eastern Question”, the problem of who is going to 
be in control of the Bosporus Straits, has been much discussed among the leaders of the 
Great Powers. Although the interests and prospects were changing by the years, the 
stable thing was the interested parties and the persistence with which they tried to 
achieve their goals. Although the Dardanelles are nothing but a small strip of sea, they 
played an important role in European and world history throughout the centuries.     
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